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The unfolding of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) for Fall 2009 in the Northern Hemisphere is still
uncertain. Plans for vaccination campaigns and vaccine trials are underway, with the first
batches expected to be available early October. Several studies point to the possibility of an
anticipated pandemic peak that could undermine the effectiveness of vaccination strategies.
Here, we use a structured global epidemic and mobility metapopulation model to assess the
effectiveness of massive vaccination campaigns for the Fall/Winter 2009. Mitigation effects
are explored depending on the interplay between the predicted pandemic evolution and
the expected delivery of vaccines. The model is calibrated using recent estimates on the
transmissibility of the new A(H1N1) influenza. Results show that if additional intervention
strategies were not used to delay the time of pandemic peak, vaccination may not be able to
considerably reduce the cumulative number of cases, even when the mass vaccination campaign
is started as early as mid-October. Prioritized vaccination would be crucial in slowing down the
pandemic evolution and reducing its burden.
Introduction
With decreasing trends for pandemic H1N1 cases reported in
most of the Southern Hemisphere countries, the concerns
regarding the epidemic evolution are now focusing on
the influenza activity during Fall 2009 in the Northern
Hemisphere.
1–3 The future unfolding of a pandemic is
dominated by a large degree of uncertainty, however, several
studies and technical reports recently outlined a likely course
of the pandemic in the next few months, identifying
plausible scenarios and quantifying the expected impact on
the population.
4–8 The modeling approaches in these studies
are characterized by the likelihood of an early epidemic
activity in the Northern Hemisphere, with the peak expected
to occur in October/November. As an effective line of
defense against influenza epidemics, most of the countries
are planning the vaccination of a large fraction of the
population.
9 Started after the virus identification at the end
of April 2009, the vaccine development and production is
well under way and recently received the approval by the
US Food and Drugs Administration.
10 Vaccine delivery is
scheduled to start in early or mid-October
10 in several
countries, but the expected timing of the pandemic
influenza activity predicted to peak in October/November
puts at risk the effectiveness of mass vaccination as a control
strategy.
Here, we use the Global Epidemic and Mobility (GLEaM)
model
7,11 to assess the effect of mass vaccination on the
predicted pandemic evolution, given the expected vaccine
availability and timing of distribution. In ref. 7, the GLEaM
model has been used to perform a Maximum Likelihood
Estimate (MLE) of the transmission potential of the current
H1N1 pandemic and provide predictions on the unfolding of
the current pandemic. Here, we use the model and predicted
patterns of global spread obtained in ref. 7 to quantify the
mitigation effect of mass vaccination campaigns and
combined strategies under different scenarios.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5)
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
10These authors equally contributed to this work.
Emerging Health Threats Journal 2009, 2:e11. doi: 10.3134/ehtj.09.011
& 2009 P Bajardi et al.; licensee Emerging Health Threats Journal.
www.eht-journal.orgMethods
Baseline model
To provide pandemic scenarios and test the implementa-
tion of mitigation strategies, we use the global epidemic
and mobility model (GLEaM), based on a spatially struc-
tured meta-population approach
7,12–23 in which the world is
divided into geographical regions defining a sub-population
network where connections among sub-populations repre-
sent the individual fluxes because of the transportation and
mobility infrastructures. GLEaM integrates three different
data layers:
7,11 (i) the population layer at a scale of 1
41 based
on the high-resolution population database of the ‘Gridded
Population of the World’ project of SEDAC (Columbia
University);
24 (ii) the transportation mobility layer integrat-
ing air travel mobility from the International Air Transport
Association (IATA)
25 and OAG
26 databases, and the com-
muting patterns and local transportation modes obtained
from the data collected and analyzed from more than
30 countries in five continents in the world;
7,11 (iii) the
epidemic layer that defines the disease and population
dynamics. The resulting model includes 3362 georeferenced
sub-populations centered around major transportation hubs
in 220 different countries.
7,11
The model simulates short range mobility between
sub-populations with a time scale separation approach that
defines the effective force of infections in connected
sub-populations.
7,11,27,28 The airline mobility from one sub-
population to another is modeled by an individual based
stochastic procedure in which the number of passengers of
each compartment traveling from a sub-population j to a
sub-population l is an integer random variable defined by the
actual data from the airline transportation database. The
infection dynamics takes place within each sub-population
and assumes the classic influenza-like-illness compartmen-
talization in which each individual is classified by one of the
following discrete states: susceptible, latent, symptomatic
infectious, asymptomatic infectious, permanently recov-
ered/removed.
29,30 The model assumes that the latent period
is equivalent to the incubation period and that no secondary
transmissions occur during the incubation period. All
transitions are modeled through binomial and multinomial
processes to ensure the discrete and stochastic nature of the
processes.
7,11 Asymptomatic individuals are considered as a
fraction pa¼33% of the infectious individuals generated in
the model and assumed to infect with a relative infectious-
ness of rb¼50%.
30–32 Change in traveling behavior after the
onset of symptoms is modeled with the probability 1 pt set
to 50% that individuals would stop traveling when ill
30
(see Figure 1 for a detailed description of the compartmen-
talization). Effects of variations of these parameters are
studied and discussed in the Supplementary Information.
In the model, we use values of generation time interval and
transmissibility according to the estimates of refs 7, 8. In
particular, we use the reproductive number R0¼1.75 with the
generation interval set to 3.6 days (average latency period of
1.1 days and an average infectious period of 2.5 days).
7
It is important to remark that the best estimate of the
reproductive number refers to the reference value that has to
be rescaled by the seasonality scaling function. Seasonality is
considered in the model by means of a sinusoidal forcing of
the reproductive number, with a scaling factor ranging from
amin during Summer season to amax during Winter season.
16
Here, we consider amax¼1.1 and amin in the range 0.6–0.7,
that is the best estimate obtained from the correlation analysis
on the chronology of 93 countries seeded before June 18 in
ref. 7 This seasonal scaling provides an effective reproductive
number in the Northern hemisphere in the range 1.2–1.6 in
the spring/fall months, in agreement with published estimates
of the reproductive number. Initial conditions are defined by
setting the start of the epidemic near La Gloria in Mexico on
18 February 2009, as in ref. 7 and analogously to other
works,
31 and following available data from official sources.
33
The above estimates of the seasonal transmission potential
is obtained by using the model to perform maximum
likelihood analysis of the parameters against the actual
chronology of newly infected countries as detailed in ref. 7
The method is computationally intensive as it involves a
Monte Carlo generation of the distribution of arrival time of
the infection in each country based on the analysis of one
million worldwide simulations of the pandemic evolution
with the GLEaM model. It is worth stressing that the model
assumes homogeneous mixing in each sub-population and
full susceptibility. The inclusion of additional structures
(such as for example, subdivision in age classes) or age-
specific features (such as age-specific transmission) are
limited by the lack of data for each of the 220 countries in
the world. These assumptions represent a necessary trade-off
for the computational efficiency of the model that allows to
perform parameter estimations fitting the worldwide pattern
of the pandemic,
7 explore several scenarios under different
conditions, and perform sensitivity analysis on the assump-
tions. Indeed, once the disease parameters and initial
conditions are defined, GLEaM generates in-silico epidemics
for which we can gather information, such as prevalence,
morbidity, number of secondary cases, number of imported
cases and many others for each sub-population with a time
resolution of one day. All results shown in the following
sections are obtained from the statistics based on at least
2000 stochastic runs of the model.
Intervention strategies
The baseline (no intervention) scenario is studied along with
mitigation strategies based on the use of antiviral drugs and
the use of vaccines.
12,18,30,32,34–40
Intervention involving vaccination is constrained on
the availability and distribution of vaccine doses matching
the novel H1N1 influenza virus. Current information on the
time and amount of delivery of the first doses of vaccine is
available for certain countries only and undergoes contin-
uous updates. Significant availability of H1N1 vaccine is
expected to begin only in mid-October or later. The United
States have initially projected 45M doses by 15 October, with
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reaching the delivery of the full amount of 195M doses by
the end of December (http://health.usnews.com/articles/
health/healthday/2009/08/21/swine-flu-vaccine-seems-safe-
in-early-trials.html; http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/
july-dec09/h1n1_09-11.html).
41 The United Kingdom plans
to have the first amount of 100,000 doses by mid-October,
with subsequent distribution of additional doses till full
coverage of the population (http://www.thelancet.com/
H1N1-flu/egmn/0c03b3cf). Little is known about vaccine
production rates and delivery for several other countries.
Here, we assume that all countries having stockpiled on
antivirals
42 would have placed orders to have vaccines
available to administer to their populations. On the basis
of the available data on vaccination programs, we explore
scenarios where the campaign starts on the same date for all
countries with vaccines, where the date is set to 15 October,
15 November. Additional dates are also studied in the
sensitivity analysis. Following previous studies on vaccina-
tion during the course of a pandemic,
6,36,37 we assume a
dynamic mass vaccination of 1% of the population uni-
formly in countries where doses are available, till their
exhaustion. We assume the administration of a single dose of
vaccine,
10,43,44 providing protection with a delay of 2
weeks.
45 The 2-weeks time to produce the immune response
was chosen according to the preliminary data in adult
clinical studies for H1N1 influenza vaccine,
10,45 and a
sensitivity analysis reducing it to 1 week was performed.
Recommendations foresee the use of vaccines first in the
groups of population who are at elevated risk of severe
outcomes or who are likely to come in contact with the
novel H1N1 virus.
46 The model does not consider social
structure in the sub-populations, therefore the effect of
prioritized distribution of vaccines to health care workers,
risk groups and others, in reducing the number of hospita-
lizations and deaths
8,46–48 is out of the scope of the present
study. Mass vaccination aims to: (i) reduce susceptibility to
infection; (ii) reduce infectiousness if infection occurs; (iii)
reduce the probability of developing clinical symptoms.
36
The efficacy of the vaccine with respect of these three effects
is quantified by the parameter VES,V E I,V E D, respectively.
The efficacy of the vaccine is still under study, therefore, we
refer to previous estimates and perform a sensitivity analysis
to explore higher and lower efficacy levels. Here, we consider
a vaccine efficacy for susceptibility VES¼70%, a vaccine
efficacy for infectiousness VEI¼30% and a vaccine efficacy
for symptomatic disease given infection VED¼50%.
8,36,49 A
full description of the disease dynamics in case mass
vaccination is considered is available in the Supplementary
Information. On the basis of the partial information on total
production amounts per country, ranging from B1/3 of the
population
50–52 to 2/3,
41 up to full coverage (http://www.
thelancet.com/H1N1-flu/egmn/0c03b3cf),
53,54 we explore
two different mass vaccination scenarios in which we assume
a 30 and a 60% coverage of the population.
We also consider combined strategies including the
systematic treatment of clinical cases with antiviral drugs
aimed at reducing the severity of the disease and the
transmissibility while infectious.
30,32,34 Actual data on anti-
viral stockpiles in the world are collected from ref. 42 and
from national agencies to model the current availability of
the drugs by country. We assume the treatment with
antivirals of 5 and 10% of clinical cases within the first day
from the onset of symptoms, along with a hypothetical
Figure 1 Compartmental structure in each sub-population. A susceptible individual interacting with an infectious person may contract the illness and enter the
latent compartment where he is infected, but not yet infectious. At the end of the latency period, each latent individual becomes infectious entering the
symptomatic compartment with probability (1-pa) or becoming asymptomatic with probability pa. Asymptomatic individuals infect with a transmission rate reduced
of rb. A fraction (1-pt) of the symptomatic individuals would stop traveling when ill. Infectious individuals recover permanently with rate m. Antiviral treatment is
assumed to be administered to a fraction pAV of the symptomatic infectious individuals within 1 day from the onset of symptoms, according to the drugs availability
in the country. It reduces the infectiousness by the antiviral efficacy AVEI and shortens the infectious period of 1 day. If vaccines are available, a fraction equal to 1%
of the susceptible population enters the susceptible vaccinated compartment each day. A similar progression to the baseline compartmentalization is considered if
infection occurs. However, the vaccine reduces the susceptibility of the vaccinated susceptible with an efficacy VEs, the probability of developing symptoms if
infection occurs with an efficacy VED, and their transmission rate while infectious with an efficacy VEi. All transition process are modeled through multinomial
processes.
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clinical cases. This parameter takes into account the prompt
detection of symptomatic cases and the rapid administ-
ration of the drug.
7,12 The treatment is considered to last
until resources are available. We assume a drug efficacy in
reducing transmission equal to 62%, and a reduction of 1
day of the total infectious period.
30,32 A schematic illustra-
tion of the compartmental diagram including the combina-
tion of intervention strategies is reported in Figure 1.
Results and discussion
According to the best estimates of the model parameters as in
the previous section, it is possible to calculate the 95%
reference range for the activity peak in each country. The
benchmark to evaluate the effect of mass vaccination
campaigns is the no intervention scenario that is predicted
to reach the activity peak for example, in the United States
between the beginning of October and the beginning of
November. In the following, we will refer to the early and
late peak cases as the earliest and latest date, respectively, of
the reference range for the activity peak time (see Table 1).
7
This allows us the consideration of the whole range of peak
times to explore the impact of mass vaccination campaigns
also in extreme situations such as very early activity peak in
October. Although we define the late peak case, it is impor-
tant to stress that also in this case, we are in the presence of
an activity peak occurring much earlier than the usual
timing of seasonal influenza. It is also worth remarking that
the prediction for the activity peak reference range obtained
in the model in the Northern Hemisphere differ from
country to country,
7 as reported in the Table 1 for the
countries analyzed here. The model allows the same analysis
for 220 countries in the world.
In the case of an activity peak at the beginning of the
reference range provided by the model (early October for the
United States and many European countries), the mass
vaccination program starting on 15 October with 30%
coverage would have almost no effect on the epidemic
profile, as the effective immunization of incremental 1% of
the population would start long after the epidemic has
peaked. In the case of a late peak corresponding to the
opposite extreme of the reference range (from early to late
November depending on the country), the peak attack rate
would be reduced by a factor of about 28% averaged across
countries, ranging from 15 to 38% depending on the specific
pandemic unfolding in each country, with a lower reduction
obtained in those countries where the epidemic would arrive
earlier (for example, United States vs Europe, according to
the predictions of Table 1). Figures 2 and 3 show the
incidence curves for a set of countries in the early and late
peak cases, respectively. In the United States, for example,
the effect of mass vaccination, when no additional inter-
vention strategy is implemented, would correspond to a 15%
reduction of the peak incidence in the most favorable
situation of a late peak and early vaccination campaign.
If the availability of the first vaccine batches is delayed of
1 month, the mass vaccination program would have almost
no mitigation effect (o2%) for all countries under study in
the whole range of scenarios explored. Moreover, no major
differences are observed with a larger coverage, given the 1%
daily distribution rate, since in both the early and late peak
extreme of the activity peak reference range the assumed
30% coverage would almost always be enough for the
distribution during the entire epidemic activity, even
assuming the early distribution starting on 15 October.
Table 1 summarizes the results for a set of countries, which
are expected to deploy vaccination programs in the next Fall,
showing expected peak reference ranges and the relative
benefit in terms of number of cases of each of the
vaccination strategies explored at the peak time and at the
end of the pandemic wave, with different starts of the
campaigns and different coverages. The percentages are
calculated as the relative reductions of the maximum of
the 95% reference range, where the interval refers to the
early and late peak cases (minimum and maximum of
the intervals, respectively). According to the above scenarios,
the mass vaccination would therefore do little against a
pandemic expected to peak before or at the beginning of
November, consistently with the simulation results on
phased vaccination strategies in the United States.
8
Table 1 Relative effect of vaccination in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario
Vaccination Baseline
peak time
Relative reduction of peak attack rate (%) Relative reduction of epidemic size (%)
Country 15 Oc
30% cov
15 Oct
60% cov
15 Nov
30% cov
15 Nov
60% cov
15 Oct
30% cov
15 Oct
60% cov
15 Nov
30% cov
15 Nov
60% cov
US (23 Sep–09 Nov) (1–15) (1–15) (0–2) (0–2) (5–25) (5–25) (1–2) (1–2)
UK (10 Oct–19 Nov) (1–29) (1–29) 0 (0–1) (11–30) (11–31) (1–4) (1–4)
Canada (04 Oct–14 Nov) (1–21) (1–21) (0–1) (0–1) (10–30) (10–32) (1–5) (1–5)
France (11 Oct–21 Nov) (2–32) (2–32) (0–2) (0–2) (12–32) (12–33) (1–5) (1–5)
Italy (17 Oct–23 Nov) (5–38) (5–38) (0–1) (0–1) (13–35) (13–36) (1–5) (1–5)
Spain (09 Oct–19 Nov) (1–30) (1–30) (0–1) (0–1) (11–32) (11–33) (1–4) (1–4)
Germany (11 Oct–20 Nov) (2–34) (2–34) (0–1) (0–1) (12–33) (12–34) (1–4) (1–4)
Results show the relative reduction obtained with each vaccination strategy with respect to the baseline case. They are calculated as the relative reduction of the
maximum of the 95% reference range obtained from 2000 stochastic realizations of the model (vaccination strategy vs baseline), and correspond to the extreme of
the reference range for the activity peak time. The 95% reference range of the activity peak in the no intervention scenario is also shown.
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also help in pushing back the epidemic peak and make more
effective the mass vaccination campaigns. Here, we report
simulations of scenarios in which the systematic use of
antiviral drugs for treatment of cases is used to delay the
epidemic peak, and to reduce the attack rate at peak time in
combination with the vaccination campaign.
12,18,30,32,34–40
If we assume a 5–10% detection of clinical cases and prompt
Figure 2 Effect of vaccination and of combined strategies for the early peak case. The incidence curves show the impact of an incremental vaccination with 1%
daily distribution policy starting on 15 October for the early peak case. The baseline case is compared with the cases in which intervention strategies are considered,
vaccination only, and combination of vaccination with antiviral treatment of 5, 10 and 30% of clinical cases. Efficacies of antiviral treatment and vaccination assume
the values reported in the main text. Median profiles obtained from 2000 stochastic realizations of the model are shown. A 60% vaccine coverage is assumed, with
the gray bar indicating the time period during which the immunization takes effect.
Figure 3 Effect of vaccination and of combined strategies for the late peak case. The incidence curves show the impact of an incremental vaccination with 1% daily
distribution policy starting on 15 October for the late peak case. The baseline case is compared with the cases in which intervention strategies are considered,
vaccination only, and combination of vaccination with antiviral treatment of 5, 10 and 30% of clinical cases. Efficacies of antiviral treatment and vaccination assume
the values reported in the main text. Median profiles obtained from 2000 stochastic realizations of the model are shown. A 30% coverage is assumed, with the gray
bar indicating the time period during which the immunization takes effect.
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B1–2 weeks in the countries with available antiviral stock-
piles. We also study a possible scenario of analysis that
assumes a 30% treatment, leading to approximately a full
month delay of the pandemic peak.
7 Though larger than the
implemented policy for the treatment of clinical cases in
some countries, it allows the study of the effectiveness of
mass vaccination campaign when a delay of 1 month can be
achieved with a combination of intervention strategies.
The delay of 1–2 weeks would allow an additional relative
reduction of 10–20% of the peak attack rate with respect to
the vaccination only scenario in case of early onset of the
mass vaccination campaign. If we consider the early peak
case, this would amount to a considerable reduction when
compared with the approximately null benefit of the
vaccination alone under the same conditions. The results
are consistent with those obtained for the case of influenza
peaking in the Northern Hemisphere in November and with
a mass vaccination campaign starting at the beginning of
October in ref. 6. Further mitigation effects would be
obtained with a 4 weeks delay because of the antiviral
treatment of 30% of the cases. This would allow gaining time
for the immunization of a vast percentage of the population
to take place. In the early peak situation, the benefit
would range from 30 to 59% in reducing the peak attack
rate depending on the specific time evolution within
each country, and assuming the onset of vaccination on
15 October. In the late peak situation, the mass vaccination
would be strongly effective in reducing the attack rate
at peak, considerably slowing down the pandemic and
mitigating the cumulative number of cases experienced after
the first wave. With respect to the maximum reduction of
38% of the peak attack rate in the corresponding vaccination
only scenario, a delay of 4 weeks achieved through the
combination of mitigation strategies would allow reductions
up to 88%, more than doubling the mitigation effect (see the
Supplementary Information). This strong mitigation would
correspond to a significant benefit in terms of number of
cases and in changing the pandemic pattern, thus redu-
cing the burden at peak time on the public health system.
Table 2 reports the results obtained for each country when
combined strategies with 5 and 10% treatment with anti-
viral drugs are considered. The results obtained with 30%
treatment are reported in the Supplementary Information.
The comparison between the results of Table 1 and Table 2
for the same set of assumptions shows that considerably
larger mitigation effects would be achieved when combina-
tion of different interventions are considered.
18,36,38,40
Finally, it is worth noting that our model assumes a 100%
susceptibility in the population, neglecting effects of
previous immunity, since no clear estimates have been
provided yet.
55–57 On the other hand, the global nature of
the model allows the simulation of the pandemic since its
start in Mexico, taking into account the population-level
immunity caused by the first peak of the spread of pandemic
H1N1 in the Northern hemisphere during the Spring and
Summer 2009. The presented results for the simulated attack
rates are likely overestimating the pandemic impact because
of the above assumptions. With the best estimate parameters
used here, we find clinical attack rates in absence of
intervention policies (that is, baseline case) of B35–40% at
the end of the epidemic. A full comparison with attack rates
estimates from real data
58 is, however, made difficult along
with the model assumption also by the large underascertain-
Table 2 Relative effect of combined strategies in reducing the peak attack rate and the epidemic size with respect to the no intervention scenario
Combined strategies Relative reduction of peak attack rate (%) Relative reduction of epidemic size (%)
Country 15 Oct
30% cov
15 Oct
60% cov
15 Nov
30% cov
15 Nov
60% cov
15 Oct
30% cov
15 Oct
60% cov
15 Nov
30% cov
15 Nov
60% cov
5% AV treatment
US (2–24) (0–24) (0–2) (0–2) (9–31) (9–31) (2–4) (2–4)
UK (5–38) (5–38) (1–2) (2–3) (15–36) (15–38) (2–7) (2–7)
Canada (1–31) (1–31) (0–2) (0–2) (14–36) (14–39) (2–7) (2–7)
France (7–42) (8–43) (1–2) (1–2) (15–38) (15–40) (2–7) (2–7)
Italy (11–48) (11–48) (1–2) (1–3) (17–41) (17–44) (2–8) (2–8)
Spain (4–41) (4–41) (1–2) (1–2) (14–38) (14–40) (2–7) (2–7)
Germany (8–44) (7–45) (1–2) (2–3) (15–39) (15–41) (2–7) (2–7)
10% AV treatment
US (1–34) (2–34) (1–3) (1–2) (13–37) (13–39) (3–6) (3–6)
UK (12–48) (12–48) (4–5) (3–4) (19–42) (19–45) (4–10) (4–10)
Canada (2–42) (2–42) (1–3) (0–1) (18–42) (18–48) (3–10) (3–11)
France (14–53) (14–53) (3–4) (3–4) (20–44) (20–48) (4–11) (4–11)
Italy (17–58) (18–58) (3–4) (3–4) (21–46) (22–52) (4–12) (4–12)
Spain (10–51) (10–52) (2–3) (2–3) (18–44) (18–49) (3–10) (3–10)
Germany (14–55) (14–55) (3–4) (3–4) (19–45) (19–50) (4–11) (4–11)
Results show the relative reduction obtained with each combined strategy with respect to the baseline case, considering the treatment with antivirals to 5 and 10%
of clinical cases. The results are calculated as the relative reduction of the maximum of the 95% reference range obtained from 2000 stochastic realizations of the
model (combined strategy vs baseline) and at the extreme of the activity peak time reference range reported in Table 1.
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systems with country-specific capacity and coverages, as
well as monitoring requirements changing in time as the
epidemic progresses. In view of the differences in the
outbreak experienced in different countries, we also report
in the Supplementary Information the sensitivity analysis
on the pandemic transmission potential and generation
time. Changes in the effectiveness of the mass vaccination
campaign are dependent on the anticipation or delay of the
pandemic evolution in the Northern Hemisphere.
Sensitivity analysis
Although the onset of vaccination is expected for mid-
October,
10,59 delays could be accumulated in their delivery
and administration to the population. A 1 month delay in
the start of the vaccination program would preclude the
immunization of the public in time for the pandemic wave.
If, on the other hand, vaccination programs are put in action
starting on 15 October with a larger distribution rate, the
mitigation effect would be enhanced. We ran a sensitivity
analysis on the 1% incremental vaccination, doubling the
vaccine administration rate. Results show a higher mitigation
with a variation in the relative reduction of the peak attack rate
of about 10% if compared with the corresponding 1% rate, in
the case of a 60% vaccine coverage with combination of
strategies (see the Supplementary Information).
The preliminary results from the first clinical trials show
that a single vaccine dose would produce an immune
response in most adults 8–14 days after its administra-
tion,
10,45 similarly to seasonal influenza vaccines. We tested,
therefore, a reduction of the time needed to provide
protection, assuming 1 week of time since the administra-
tion of the vaccines, with the vaccination onset in mid-
October. This is effectively equivalent to a vaccination
campaign starting 1 week earlier than 15 October, with
the same distribution rate to the public. The anticipation
of 1 weekFor, equivalently, the faster immunization
process after each vaccinationFwould progressively provide
a larger benefit in the mitigation of the pandemic wave,
with an additional reduction of about 10% in comparison
with the 15 October vaccination onset (see the Supplemen-
tary Information). This result confirms that the acceleration
of vaccine administration is a key aspect to control next
Fall wave.
The efficacy of the H1N1 vaccine is still uncertain. Here,
we used as baseline values of efficacy the ones estimated for
seasonal influenza,
8,36,49 and explored a vaccine efficacy for
susceptibility in the range (50–90%), along with a lar-
ger vaccine efficacy for infectiousness, equal to 80%.
37
The resulting effects in the mitigation of the peak attack
rate are limited to variations of up to 5% with respect to the
baseline values of the efficacies, showing that the timing
and distribution rates have a larger role in the mitigation
with respect to the above variations in the efficacies. All
results of the analysis are reported in the Supplementary
Information.
Conclusions
The interplay between the timing of the pandemic and the
start of the dynamic vaccination campaign is crucial for
mitigation effects. Results show that mass vaccination may
have little effect on controlling the pandemic even when
administered as early as mid-October, unless additional
mitigation strategies are considered to delay the activity
peak. This makes also a strong case for prioritized vaccina-
tion programs focusing on high-risk groups, healthcare and
social infrastructure workers. Should the pandemic peak
much later than anticipated from the modeling approach, in
December or January, there would be enough time to provide
immunization to a larger fraction of the population given
the current schedule for vaccination campaign, with a larger
mitigation effect than in the early pandemic wave situation.
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